Denver Law Review
Volume 10

Issue 4

Article 2

1933

Vol. 10, no. 4: Full Issue
Dicta Editorial Board

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr

Recommended Citation
10 Dicta (1933).

This Full Issue is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

DICTA

VOLUME 10
1932-1933

DICTA
IpX9LqT&%
.S.

0.I

20 cents a copy

$1.75 a year

FEBRUARY, 1933
Dicta Observes ..
Address .

.......
.

101

.......

By A. L. Doud

Expediting Court Procedure.

.

113

By George F. Dunklee
Dictaphun.

.

122

........

Supreme Court Decisions

.

.

124

Published monthly by the Denver Bar Association and devoted to
the interests of the Association.
Address all communications concerning:
Editorial Matters, to Dicta, Louis A. Hellerstein, Editor-in-Chief,
1020 University Bldg., Denver, Colo.
Advertising, to Dicta, Sydney H. Grossman, Business Manager,
618 Symes Bldg., Denver, Colo.
Subscriptions, to Dicta, John A. Carroll, Secretary Denver Bar
Association, 1022 Midland Savings Bldg., Denver, Colo.
Member of Colorado Press Association

DENVER BAR ASSOCIATION
1932-1933
ALBERT J. GOULD, JR., President
HAROLD H. HEALY, First Vice-President
CHARLES ROSENBAUM, Second Vice-President
JOHN A. CARROLL, Secretary-Treasurer
Business Office: 1022 Midland Savings Building. Phone:

MA 6146

EXECUTIVE SECTION
ALBERT J. GOULD, JR., ex-officio
HENRY A. DUBBS, B. M. WEBSTER
to July 1, 1933

TRUSTEES
GUY K. BREWSTER, ERNEST B. FOWLER
to July 1, 1934
DUDLEY W. STRICKLAND, FRANK E. GOVE
to July 1, 1935

COMMITTEE CHAIRMEN
Luncheons
JAMES A. WOODS

ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION
Banquets
Medical-Legal
ROBERT E. MORE
HENRY H. CLARK
Outing
CHARLES J. KELLY

Memorial
EDGAR MCCOMB

LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL SECTION
Criminal Justice
American Law Institute
New Court House
FRED E. DICKERSON
BERNARD J. SEEMAN
FRANK L. FETZER
Women and Children
Judicary
WILLIAM E. HUTTON
MARY F. LATHROP
Ethics
EDWARD D. UPHAM

BAR STANDARDS AND LEGAL AID SECTION
Grievance
Legal Education
FREDERICK W. SANBORN, JR. ROBERT W. STEELE

Citizenship
JACK GARRETT SCOTT

Membership
LEO J. CROWLEY

PUBLIC RELATIONS SECTION
Judicial Salaries
Press and Bar
HAMLET J. BARRY
JOSEPH A. MYERS
Unlawful Practice of Law
MAX MELVILLE

GENERAL
Auditing
Legislative
FRED S. CALDWELL
JOSEPH P. O'CONNELL
Justice Court
Sub-Committee
GUSTAVE J. ORNAUER

Legal Aid
JOHN ROTRUCK
Publicity

JOSEPH C. SAMPSON

Justice Court
HORACE N, HAWKINS

DICTA
EDITORIAL BOARD
LOUIS A. HELLERSTEIN, Editor-in-Chief
DAYTON DENIOUS. Trial Court Decisions
RoY 0. SAMSON, Associate Editor
B, C. HILLIARD, JR., Dictaphun
NOAH A. ATLER, Associate Editor
ALLEN MOORE, Historian
SYDNEY H. GROSSMAN, Business Manager
C. CLYDE BARKER, Editor
ERNEST C. BURCK

Supreme Court Decisions
MARTIN C. MOLHOLM
NATHAN R. KOBEY

GEORGE LONGFELLOW, JR.
ROBERT PALMER

DICTA
Vol. X

I]'Dicta

FEBRUARY, 1933

No. 4

Observes

At the first meeting of the Mississippi Bar Association
held at Jackson, Mississippi, September 1-2, 1932, Pres. Guy
A. Thompson, of the American Bar Association, made an
interesting comment to the effect that thirty presidents of the
United States, forty-eight secretaries of state, fifty-six signers
of the Declaration of Independence, and fifty-five framers of
the Constitution, were all lawyers.
At this meeting the law's delay in jury cases came in for
some attention. It was pointed out that in St. Louis, after
pleadings are settled, it frequently takes fourteen months to
get to trial; in Detroit, forty-two months from beginning;
New York City, twenty-four to thirty-six months, and that
this condition was not exceptional but fairly illustrative of a
condition that is nation-wide.
JURORS' FEES
Trumbull County (Ohio) jurors' pay has been reduced
from $3.00 to $2.00 per diem and mileage.
A committee report in Massachusetts recommends a decrease of $1.00 per day in jurors' fees. At the same time it
recommends an increase in docket and other fees.
TRIAL BY AUDITOR
The Superior Court at Boston, during the past year,
tried the experiment of referring motor tort cases to auditors.
In 1931 there were 468 cases referred; in the first nine months
of 1932 there was a reference of 2,090 cases. It was thought
this would be an economical and speedy method of relieving
the docket.
The experiment failed to work out, as the practice-beto jury trials-increased the present cost of
supplemental
ing
the courts.

OUR NEW MUNICIPAL BUILDING
(DEDICATORY)

By Rees D. Rees, of the Denver, Colorado, Bar

I.

Today we're met to dedicate
This beauteous structure, grand, ornateA pearl in Denver's glorious crown,
Adding lustre to her renown;
Glittering bright 'neath sunny skies,
A jewel fair, we highly prize.
II.
O may it always ever be
Right's own hearthside, eternally;
May those who serve within its walls
Be honest, true, heed Justice' calls;
Never, there, may an echo rise,
Subversive where our honor lies.
III.

Invoke we now God's watchful eye,
That e'er its halls may glorify,
Our land, our flag, our people brave,
Their int'rests, rights, conserve and save.
Then generations yet unborn
Our tombs, memorial, will adorn.

ADDRESS BY A. L. DOUD
Honorable Judges of All the Courts, former Judges of All
the Courts, My Professional Brethren of the Bar, and
Fellow Citizens:
T is greatly to be regretted that our honored citizen, the
brilliant lawyer and statesman, and one of the best loved
members of our profession, the Honorable Charles S.
Thomas, could not speak at this hour.
Allow me to express my great appreciation for the rare
courtesy and signal honor conferred on me, in requesting me
to make an address upon this occasion.
It is a rare personal pleasure to look into the faces of so
many of you who have been my cordial friends in the years
gone by, and whom I have held in the highest esteem, and
for whom I have had the most affectionate regard.
It is also, with no small degree of pride, that I look back
over the years and see so many of the men who have adorned
the Bench, as you have, and recall that never, during my
memory of substantially half a century, has the judicial
ermine been soiled by the leprous finger of suspicion.
This little address (if such it may be called) has been
prepared under peculiarly adverse circumstances. When the
invitation was first presented, I had just finished one round
in a contest with the universal enemy, the flu. In that first
round I was reasonably successful. After the invitation there
was a second round, in which I was hopelessly outclassed
and I have the unpleasant memory of hearing the Referee
count ten and count me out.
This tenth day of January, A. D. 1933, should be a
memorable one in the history of Denver. It is the opening
day of the first term of court to be held in this magnificent
building. It is an epoch in the life of this city. This great
municipal building has been completed; a building that, in its
solidity and stability represents the character of the citizens
of Denver. May I dwell upon this structure for a few moments?
In size it is a few inches more than 439 feet in length; a
few inches more than 273 feet in width, and from the ground
to the top of the tower there is a distance of 200 feet.
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In its dimensions it is larger than the Pantheon of Rome
and twice the size of the Parthenon of ancient Greece. I am
advised by the architect that it is of modified Roman architectural design, although in the front there are Corinthian pillars, somewhat over 50 feet in height.
The exterior portions of the walls are made of granite.
The lining of the interior portions is of Travertine; the floors
of the corridors are marble and Terrazzo, and many of the
rooms are covered with a soundless substance made of cork.
The building, excluding architects' fees, has been constructed
at a cost of $4,704,558. I am also informed by the architect
that it contains a thousand rooms; I did not make the count.
Here are rooms for all the courts of the City and County of
Denver, and here are offices for all the city officials.
The old Court House, as it was originally constructed
and completed, was built at a cost of $327,602, and with the
additional story that was placed upon it, at a later date, the
aggregate expense was $432,602. The block of ground
on which the former Court House was built cost $18,000 in
1875. The block of ground on which this building is erected,
though somewhat farther from the heart of the city, cost
$550,620.50.
Rare judgment has been exhibited in the location of this
new and massive structure. It faces to the east and stands
just across the .street from the beautiful park, almost in the
heart of Denver, known as the Civic Center. Nearby, and
located on the Civic Center, stands the Public Library building, and a little to the south of that, in the same Civic Center,
is located the beautiful structure known as the Greek Theatre; to the east and on the opposite side of the Civic Center
is the granite Capitol building of the State of Colorado, with
its spacious grounds.
Denver is buttressed on the west by these eternal hills and
beautified in all other directions by the now fertile plains.
From this vantage point one may look at the mighty mountains which never grow old and whose grandeur never seems
less. Looking along this majestic range, we may distinctly
see, to the south, at a distance of seventy-five miles, perhaps
the best known of all the Colorado mountains, Pikes Peak.
Looking westward and towering above all the other
peaks near it, a distance of about thirty-five miles, is Mt.
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Evans, named for the illustrious early Governor, John Evans,
who was appointed by Abraham Lincoln.
Sixty-five miles to the north we see Long's Peak, issuing
its invitation to the world and saying, "Come and visit Estes
Park, the beauty spot of all the Rockies."
It is interesting to note that in the altitude of these three
great peaks, standing out like sentinels, there is a difference
of only twenty-three feet.
This is a structure of which the City of Denver may well
be proud. There has been criticism concerning it, it is true,
but it is easier to criticise than to construct; it is easier to tear
down than to build up. When the old Court House, of
which I have already spoken, was constructed, the officials
encountered the bitterest criticism and opposition. There
was opposition to the site selected; there was opposition to
every site that was suggested, and there was opposition to
the building of any court house at all. When the site was
finally selected, about half a mile south of the business section of the city, the newspapers sarcastically congratulated
Littleton, a town ten miles away, upon having been selected
as the place for the new Court House.
All honor to those who build, whether it is along material, cultural or spiritual lines!
When I inquired as to the probable length of life of this
building, I was told that, notwithstanding its massive construction, its life was probably only 150 years. I cannot concur in this opinion. It seems to me that unless destroyed by
some great convulsion of nature or by some unfortunate political revolution, it should stand for a thousand years. We
may not chain the hand of nature, but with wisdom and
justice we and those who follow after us should be able, by
wise conduct and honest administration, to stay the hand of
every political upheaval.
With what unstinted admiration have I witnessed, in the
years gone by, the courage of this court, and the Supreme
Court, in the days of threatened violence! The courage of
this court and every court in Colorado has always stood the
test. The calm, dispassionate action of this court, its adherence to law and order, have ever proven to be a bulwark
against which the wild waves of passion and turbulence have
beaten in vain. Under wise legislative enactments and sound
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judicial guidance, I have the faith to believe that this building will stand for centuries yet to come.
This, however, is a changing and developing world.
When the former Court House was erected, it seemed as
though it would answer for a century or two, at least. Yet
in less than a dozen years it was insufficient for the purpose
for which it was constructed. Many of you will recall that
the old Court House, when first completed, consisted of the
basement, two stories, and sort of an attic. The main court
room on the 16th Street side occupied all the 16th Street side
of the building, and was spacious, commodious and beautiful. The court was presided over at that time by the Honorable Victor A. Elliott.
On the 15th Street side of the building were the Criminal
Court and other offices. The Criminal Court was presided
over at one time by the Honorable Platt Rogers and at another time by the Honorable Wilbur F. Stone.
While it is true that we must face the future with dauntless courage, I am reminded that this occasion might consist
of a reminiscent hour and that we might profit by reviewing
some of the scenes of earlier days and recalling some of the
faces of the vanished friends.
It is approximately seventy-five years since the place
whereon now stands this beautiful building was known as
"The Great American Desert." Its only inhabitants were the
wild beasts and wild Indian tribes, with possibly now and
then a daring and adventurous trapper or Indian trader.
Sometime in 1858, or prior thereto, it was told that gold
had been found in the Rocky Mountains. As the rumor
spread to the eastern states, men began looking westward and
the trek began across the plains. Many of these early settlers
were of heroic mould, but there were others of desperate character. The earliest lawyer that came to Colorado was
George Hicks, a Cherokee Indian, but he came not to engage
in the practice of the law, but in search of the precious metal.
The first lawyer that really came to engage in the practice of
his profession was one D. C. Collier, a man said to be of
worthy character and high aspirations.
At a little later date it was found also that here in Colorado could be found something-better than silver or gold;
that here, on these arid plains, and under these cloudless skies,
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the asthmatic might find rest from threatened suffocation and
that here the white plague had lost its terrors; that Colorado
and the Rocky Mountain region was the Mecca for the sick,
and that here, to the pallid cheek of the invalid, there could
be restored once more the bloom of health.
Prior to the time when Colorado became a territory, in
1861, there was endless confusion concerning the courts.
Some believed that the courts of the Territory of Kansas
should control; others contended that the land had belonged
to the Indians and did not belong to Kansas and that a new
territory should be organized, known as Jefferson Territory.
Miners' courts were established along the lines of earlier
mining courts in California and were among the first and
probably the best of courts.
The first miners' court was organized in what was known
as the Gregory District and was created in May, 1859. These
miners' courts, organized in the mining districts, were little
republics in themselves, sometimes only a mile square; sometimes they included a much larger territory. Criminal and
civil codes were adopted. The miners' court consisted of a
President, a Judge (known as a Probate Judge), a Recorder,
a Sheriff or Constable, and a Surveyor. The miners' courts
provided punishment for different offenses. Murder was
punishable by hanging. Manslaughter by such punishment
as a jury might direct. Threatening to kill by a fine, and
the infliction of as many stripes on the bare back as a jury
might direct, and this might also be followed by banishment
from the district.
A person found guilty of petit larceny might be fined
double the amount stolen, and given such other punishment
as a jury might direct and be banished from the district. A
person found guilty of grand larceny could be fined in a
sum double the amount stolen and receive not less than fifteen, nor more than three hundred lashes, on his bare back,
and be banished from the district, and he might also be subjected to such other punishment as a jury might direct. In
one miners' court it was provided that in case of larceny the
defendant might not only be banished, but in case he failed to
leave immediately, he should receive not less than five nor
more than twenty-nine lashes, and in case the property stolen
was of a value over one hundred dollars, he might be hung.
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Banishment was an important item of punishment. One
can easily understand that if by some good fortune a man
had discovered a rich placer ground or other valuable property, he would not like to suffer banishment.
Another peculiar provision of the miners' court was that
no suit should be brought in the district for an indebtedness
contracted in any other state or territory, except with the consent of all parties. It was also provided that an appeal should
lie from the decision of the miners' courts to the decision of
the miners, in a meeting held for that purpose.
An incident is told concerning a man named Franklin,
who had been convicted of murder by the miners' court, and
the decision had been reversed on appeal; he was out on bail
and was required to appear at court, and did appear, from
time to time, until it became a joke among the people, and
when they saw him coming to the court, they would say:
"Here comes Billy Franklin to be hung again."
In addition to the courts that I have mentioned, it was
found that there should be in Denver a People's Court for the
punishment of crime. The People's Court was somewhat
similar to the Vigilantes, but it was a court called by a citizen
or citizens; a judge or judges were appointed, some person
was appointed to prosecute and another to represent the defendant. A jury was impaneled, the defendant tried, and if
found guilty, and convicted of murder, would be hanged on
the same or the following day. The equipment necessary
for such punishment consisted of a team and wagon, a rope,
and a cottonwood tree with an overhanging limb. It is said
that on one occasion when the defendant had been convicted
of murder and was about to be hanged, as he stood in the
wagon with the rope around his neck, the appointed sheriff
asked if there wasn't someone who could offer a prayer for
the convicted wretch. Some Christian man was found; he
climbed into the wagon and kneeled down to pray. The defendant stood erect and the sheriff punched him in the ribs
and said: "You pagan, don't you know that you should
kneel in time of prayer?" The prayer was ended, the rope
was fastened, the wagon was driven away, and the defendant
hung.
Those were primitive times in Denver. By the latter
part of 1859, constructive efforts had been made to improve
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conditions and upon the organization of the territory, courts
were established in ordinary form.
Then began the influx of citizens and the coming of lawyers also. I may recall at this time only the vanished faces,
but what a galaxy of stars rises before me!
Elbert, Belford, the Tellers, Wolcott, Sayre, Blake, Hallett, Telford, Patterson, Markham, Decker, Miller, Symes,
Stone, Butler, Hughes, Brown, Macon, Yonley, Dixon, Orahood, Steck, O'Donnell, Symes, Stalcup, Luethe, Toll, Shafroth, Rogers, Talbot, I cannot name them all! I have
sought to name only those who have gone the way of all the
earth but I cannot refrain from calling to mind some of the
friendly faces of those who were living when I first came to
Colorado and who still remain.
D. B. Graham, Robert Foote, John H. Reddin, John
Denison, Gus Bartels, James H. Blood, and the stripling who
came from Georgia in 1871, Charles S. Thomas.
The District Court, after the organization of the territory, was held part of the time on Larimer Street, between
15th and 16th Streets, and then later at the corner of 15th
and Larimer Streets. In 1883 the District Court was moved
to the Court House which we have just abandoned.
Of those lawyers of the earlier days, Judge Hallett stands
forth as one of the great judges who served on the Supreme
Court of this state for ten years and then for thirty years as
judge of the Federal Court. Judge Hallett was austere and
somewhat censorious on the bench. He was the youngest of
the judges of the Supreme Court; he always stood upon his
dignity, and yet Senator Thomas Bowen called him Moses,
the Meek. At some time or other, Judge Hallett made some
caustic comment to almost every lawyer that practiced before
him. I think Willard Teller was particularly the object of
Judge Hallett's critical remarks. It is said that upon one
occasion while Mr. Teller was discussing a question of law
upon which the court was ruling against him, he said to the
judge: "What would you suggest?" Judge Hallett replied:
"Mr. Teller, I would suggest that you consult a lawyer."
Beneath that stern and dignified exterior of the judge, however, we found a delightful gentleman, tender and kind in
every respect.
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Upon one occasion a member of the bar was deprived of
his right to practice law. The opinion had been pronounced
by Judge Belford. As the unfortunate defendant vanished
from the room, Judge Hallett interrupted to say that that
was the saddest duty that he had ever been required to perform while on the bench, and in the presence of the other
members of the court and all the members of the bar who
were then present, he covered his face with his hands, broke
down and wept like a mother weeping for the loss of her
first-born.
In his court we all enjoyed his criticisms when they were
addressed to the other fellow. We were like the Irishman
who was asked if he didn't sometimes feel like committing
suicide, and he replied that he did, but never on himself.
I recall one occasion when the judge criticised me very
severely and the lawyers sitting around the court room were
smiling as they enjoyed my discomfiture. Judge Hallett, observing this, finished his statement by saying, "Mr. Doud, all
these other gentlemen sitting here do exactly the same thing."
The wit and wag of the bar was doubtless General Sam
Brown. He probably commenced more and won less cases
than any lawyer in the state. It was said of him that he
would rather tell a story than get a verdict from a jury.
Some of you may remember the days when the Superior
Court was held in the City Hall and was presided over by
Judge Merrick A. Rogers. On one occasion Judge Decker, a
capable and most affable lawyer, was trying a case with General Brown upon the opposite side. When it came time for
Brown to reply to Decker's argument, he told the court that
Decker's judgment was not good; that his views were unsound and that he could prove it by the fact that only that
morning he had seen Decker endeavoring to set his watch by
a wooden sign of a clock that he saw upon the street.
Another story that is told of General Sam Brown is that
on one occasion he sat down in Judge Hallett's court and by
some inadvertence he sat upon a tack that was pointing upward; that he immediately jumped to his feet and exclaimed:
"This court is too sharp at the wrong end."
One of the others of those early days that I have mentioned was the Honorable E. 0. Wolcott; he was exceedingly
timid in the early days of his practice, according to Mr.
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Thomas, and did not want to appear in court, even to discuss
a demurrer or take a judgment by default. He always sought
to have someone else do it for him. But there came a time
when his brother, Henry Wolcott, and Nathaniel P. Hill said
to him that unless he would try their cases and attend to their
business personally, they would take it from him. Wolcott
then became District Attorney for the First District, and the
time came when he must prosecute a criminal case. Even
after this admonition from his brother and Mr. Hill, he went
to Hugh Butler and asked him if he would not help him to
try that case. Mr. Butler refused and took Wolcott to task
for his timidity and it became necessary for Wolcott to try
the case alone. He said afterwards that he had no conception
of what he said to the jury; that he seemed to be suspended
between heaven and earth and all that he could remember was
that he was uttering some audible sounds. Later, he was
astonished beyond measure to learn that the jury had convicted the defendant. From that time, confidence came to the
young lawyer and he became, not only one of the great orators of Colorado, but also an orator of national renown.
It was generally believed that Patterson was winning
cases that sometimes he should have lost, and that the wand
of the orator was one of his efficient weapons. Many times
have I been told by the men who sat upon the jury in cases
where Patterson was counsel, that in that particular case, in
which those jurors sat, Patterson was always right.
Judge Samuel Belford was also one of the first three of
the judges of the Supreme Court and he was known and remembered as a judge of great ablity. His daughter, Frances
Wayne, is now one of the gifted writers on the Denver Post.
Judge E. T. Wells was the other of the first three judges
of the Supreme Court of this state. On the bench he was a
martinet, but a great judge. Off the bench, he was delightfully companionable. What strange quirks we sometimes
have! Often has Judge Wells told me that it was his ambition to own the finest horses in the land and house them in a
stable where the stalls were made of marble and the trimmings made of gold.
One of the quaint characters of those early days was
George W. Miller, tall, lean, lanky, and angular-he became
judge of the County Court and before him some of you must
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have had the fortune or misfortune, as the case may have
been, to represent a client. You will recall him as the great
compromiser. If the plaintiff should sue for $110.50 and
the matter was disputed, Judge Miller would say: "This
seems to be a case where the equities are about evenly divided
and the judgment will be rendered for the plaintiff in the
amount of $55.25."
However, there came a time when the judge was desperately puzzled. John DeWeese brought a replevin suit before him for a horse. DeWeese insisted to the court that this
was not a case that could be compromised; he didn't want the
front half of the horse nor the rear half, he wanted the whole
horse, or none. My information is that he got none.
Judge Amos Steck was also on the bench for a while, and
a person going to his office, on one occasion, after he had retired from the bench, heard him most vigorously exclaiming:
"The Supreme Court will reverse it; the Supreme Court will
reverse it; the decision is iniquitous; it is damnably iniquitous."
The listener finally said to him: "Judge, whose decision
is that you are talking about?"
He said: "It's my own; it's my own."
It is reported of another judge, by that inimitable storyteller, Will Dayton, that he stepped into the court room one
day and heard a judge, then on the bench, who had been
hearing a Chancery case concerning the inadequacy of a purchase price at a sale, and that the court submitted to the jury
the question whether the inadequacy of the price was sufficient to shock the conscience of the Chancellor.
I am now reminded that life is short and time is fleeting.
The judges of this day upon the District Bench of this
city and county are:
Charles C. Sackmann, Frank McDonough, Sr., George F.
Dunklee, Henley A. Calvert, J. C. Starkweather, E. V. Holland, Robert W. Steele.
May I just call to mind some of the judges of the other
days?
Victor A. Elliott, Platt Rogers, George W. Allen, C. P.
Butler, D. V. Burns, 0. B. Liddell, David B. Graham, W. S.
Decker, Frank T. Johnson, Amos J. Rising, John A. Perry,
Carlton M. Bliss.
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May I pause here for a moment? You will remember
what an urbane and winsome fellow was Judge Bliss. Let me
tell this story on myself.
I was trying a case before him and I had called to the
witness stand one who had come from the same place from
which I came. For some vain reason, I now think, I asked
that witness if he came from the same town that I did. Objection was made, on the ground that it was immaterial.
Judge Bliss said he didn't know about its being immaterial,
but it seemed to him that the witness might properly assert
his constitutional privilege and not incriminate himself.
Other of the District judges were: John I. Mullins, J. A.
Bentley, W. D. Wright, W. A. Haggott, Harry C. Riddle,
Hubert L. Shattuck, Charles C. Butler, Julian H. Moore,
Greeley W. Whitford, John H. Denison, James H. Teller,
and Owen E. LeFevre.
Perhaps I have omitted some. I have been unable to
come to the office and procure any records whatsoever for this
address.
Then I think of the judges of the County Court. Maybe
I cannot recall all of them, but there were: Amos Steck, B. F.
Harrington, George W. Miller, Owen E. LeFevre, Robert W.
Steele, Grant Hudson, Ben Lindsey, Judge Dixon, Ira C.
Rothgerber, and the present incumbent, George A. Luxford.
I should like to tell an incident concerning Judge Whitford, whom I see sitting yonder. Many years ago the judge
was prosecutor in the Federal Court; I had a case in that
court, in which I represented the defendant. While we were
impaneling the jury, Judge Whitford came to me and said,
pointing to a man in the jury box, "Doud, that man is a
friend of mine; I'm just telling you in advance." I thought
I could be as honorable to the judge as he had been to me
and I concluded to keep that juror. I lost my case. It was
that particular juror that caused me to lose it.
A few days ago Judge Starkweather called my attention
to the fact that in 1883 there were in this city 238 lawyers,
of whom only 10 are living at this time.
"They are passing away, these friends of old,
Like a leaf on the current cast,
With never a break in the rapid flow
As we watch them, one by one, as they go
Into the dreamland of the past."
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I have stated something of the merits of the judges who adorn
the present bench and those who have adorned it heretofore.
However, I have never conceded for an instant that they were
all perfect. I think I could prove that now and then, they
make a mistake, if I could take a vote of those who sit in
front of me, instead of behind me. However, I am reminded
of the story that one of the judges of the Supreme Court told
me. I should not like to name him personally, because then
you would recognize him, but when he was a member of
Congress I visited him and he said to me one day:
"Doud, when I first came to Congress I wondered how
in the world I got here, but after I'd been here a couple of
weeks I wondered how in the world the rest of them got
here."
We are apt to magnify the past and overlook the present.
I believe that this day is better than any day of the past; that
the present bench is equal to that of any preceding date and
the present bar is not excelled by those of former times.
My childhood days-were spent upon the wide and sweeping prairies of Illinois, where neighbors were scarce and playmates were few. One, however, was a cousin of mine, who
visited me occasionally, and in the afternoon when the sun
was sinking towards the west and it was time for him to
return to his prairie home, I would invariably ask my mother
if I could go a piece with him. My mother always acquiesced and the visit was finished as I went the piece with him.
May I assure you, members of the bench and members of
the bar, that at this late date when necessarily I am nearing
the end of the long, long trail, there comes to me the memory
of the days that I spent in forensic contests before this court,
and other courts, with these members of the bar, and as tender
as the mountain zephyrs are at the summer eventide, as refreshing as a shower in May, and as fragrant as the odor of
the wild roses that grew in my native state, is the memory of
the days that I have been permitted to walk a piece with you.
Judge Wilbur M. Alter and Ernest B. Upton have
formed a law partnership under the firm name of Alter and
Upton.

EXPEDITING COURT PROCEDURE
By Geo. F. Dunklee, Presiding Judge District Court, at
Luncheon of the Denver Bar Association, January 9, 1933
Honorable Judges and Members of the Denver Bar:

I

APPRECIATE that it has not heretofore been customary
for a retiring presiding judge of this court to make a
report, or make suggestions or recommendations concerning the procedure or business of the court to the bench
or bar.
However, it may not be out of place. I am confirmed in
that opinion because the law singles out the judges of the
Supreme and District Courts from all other persons in Sec.
7165, C. L. 1921, which is as follows:
"It shall be and is hereby declared to be the duty of the judges of the supreme
and district courts, to make a special report to the legislature, at each session thereof,
of all such defects, omissions or imperfections in this code, as experience may suggest."

When I hear of laymen, that have never given any special study to the subject, advocating sweeping changes in our
constitution, civil code of procedure and laws, without the
advice of competent counsel, I think that perhaps said judges
have been derelict in the performance of that duty.
However that may be, I make the following recommendations which I deem pertinent to the occasion, based upon
my experience as an attorney at law, judge and presiding
judge of this court.
I.
In the April, 1932, issue of "Dicta" there is an article
entitled "Speeding Up Justice" (p. 158), followed by a report of a committee on the subject (p. 167), which has been
considered by the court en banc.
Sections 5718 to 5720, C. L. 1921, provide, in substance,
that a judicial district of the district court having more than
one judge, each judge shall exercise all of the powers and
functions of his court, and, therefore, each judge can and does
conduct his court in his own way, and will continue to do so
unless the court en banc, or the judges by common consent,
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should deem it advisable to adopt some rules or practice on
the particular subjects hereinafter mentioned in order to make
it more uniform and better understood for the benefit of court
and counsel.
II.
The new municipal building, the court rooms of which
we formally dedicate tomorrow-the first day of the January, 1933, term of court-when Hon. Charles C. Sackmann
takes office as presiding judge-is situated three and a half
blocks from the old court house-over a quarter of a mile
one way and over half mile round trip, taking more than
fifteen minutes extra time as usually walked to and from
court, or about a half hour's walk each way from the downtown law office district.
The foregoing is of sufficient importance to cause us to
pause and consider if some system or practice of the court
cannot be adopted that will save attorneys and clients from
making any unnecessary and useless trips to and from court.
III.
This seems particularly fitting when we consider that the
courts were established by the people, and for the benefit of
the people, in which to transact their legal business. Consider that a trip takes about, if not quite, a half day's time of
a lawyer, and a day for his client and witnesses every time he
or they come to court and are simply told by the judge when
they can come again. The ordinary run of cases does not involve sufficient to stand the expense caused by delay and
unnecessary trips to court.'

IV.
REVENUE OF CLERK'S OFFICE

Previous to the act concerning the taxing of fees, S. L.
1923, p. 249, whereby a flat docket fee of $7.50 or $12.50
was fixed, according to the kind of an action, as a total cost
for the plaintiff to pay for trial in each case filed, and a fee of
$5.00 for the appearance of the defendant, the revenue of the
clerk's office was derived from a multitude rf small fees from
"5 cents to $1.50," for each paper filed or order entered as
per Sec. 7878, C. L. 1921.
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V.
JUDGE SWEARS WITNESSES

Among other things, a fee was established to be taxed as
clerk's costs for each witness sworn by him, but there was no
provision for taxing any costs if the judge performed that
duty. Consequently, it was customary for revenue purposes
for the clerk's office to have the clerk of the division swear the
witnesses instead of the judge.
In view of the change of the fee system by said law of
1923, in my opinion it is better for the trial judge to swear
the witnesses during the trial of a case, and thereby relieve the
division clerk from any unnecessary interruption in the performance of his duties. I have in mind that the division clerk
has a great deal of work to do in taking and writing up his
orders, answering inquiries of attorneys on the telephone, or
otherwise, and notifying them when their cases will be
reached, and other matters that accommodate counsel, and
count for efficiency in handling of the docket and business of
the court.
VI.
MATTERS OF COURSE

In my judgment matters of course, defaults, noncontested divorce cases, alimony hearings and all such matters of
course, should come up for hearing and disposition at 9:30
A. M., without any previous notice or setting of the same of
record by the court, and heard before taking up the trial of
cases. Such a practice saves the time of court and counsel,
and "speeds up justice." Where such a practice prevails
daily, it seldom, if ever, runs past 10:00 A. M., and as a rule
not to exceed fifteen minutes.
VII.
UNNECESSARY ORDERS

Under the old fee system quite a number of unnecessary
acts or orders were made for extra revenue for the clerk's
office. In my opinion all such orders should be done away
with, as they simply tend to make unnecessary work for the
clerk's office-such orders as continuing all cases on the docket
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from day to day, striking a case from the trial docket, except
on request of an attorney, which nceessitates another notice
and a re-setting of the case, instead of carrying the same on
the docket and taking it up for trial when the parties are
ready.
For instance, where a divorce case comes on for trial as
noncontested, the custom of an attorney for one of the parties asking for an order withdrawing an answer, a cross bill
or a complaint, before the case is set for trial as a noncontested case, serves no useful or legal purpose. Every such
order requires four operations: first, a division clerk makes
an entry on his pad; second, writes it up on his minute sheet;
third, a clerk in the main office writes it in the registry of
actions, and, fourth, a clerk types it in the permanent book.
If the issues are made up, or it is noncontested of record,
and one of the parties does not desire to contest the case, the
attorney for such party can so state in open court, and it can
be set for trial and the case proceeds at once as a noncontested
case, which legally adjudicates the matter for all purposes
just as effectively as though the foregoing extra orders were
asked and granted. There is no more legal reason for making
those orders in a noncontested divorce case than there would
be in any other case that comes on for trial before the court
where a party does not wish to prosecute or defend, and so
states for the record.
VIII.
SETTING OF CASES

All cases regularly noticed for trial, either to the court or
jury, should be set on the first day of the term, unless special
setting is made, and all other cases should stand on the docket
as set for the first day, and be given special settings from time
to time as requested to suit the convenience of both court and
counsel.
The advantage of the foregoing system is that the clerk
who keeps the docket has all of the cases before him, and in
case some that were especially set are settled, or, for some reason, cannot be tried, many times can immediately get in touch
with attorneys who can get ready for trial.
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Ix.
UNTRIED CASES STAND ON DOCKET
In my opinion, a case once regularly set on the trial

docket should remain there, and not be stricken therefrom,
except by request of counsel. If the case is not tried on the
date set, as has been stated, it can be carried on the trial
docket as originally set, until some time convenient to court
and counsel, when it can be tried. The division clerk can
usually conveniently arrange this matter over the 'phone, or
otherwise, by agreement of counsel without coming to court
in person. If the attorneys cannot agree, the matter can be
regularly heard and decided by the court.

X.
AVOIDS DELAY

Where such system does not prevail it frequently happens that the court gets behind with its docket, notwithstanding some of the time it cannot find a case ready for trial,
first, due to a case specially set and being at the last moment,
just before trial, settled or dismissed, and, second, other cases
set for a particular day cannot be called; whereas, some cases
could have been taken up and tried or disposed of, if some of
them had been left standing on the docket as set on the first
day of the term, and counsel kept in touch with the clerk over
the 'phone, thus enabling the court to keep up with the board
and not get behind.
Experience shows that cases settled are many times not
actually settled until they are reached on the docket and the
court is ready to start the trial.

XI.
AT CHAMBERS

Sec. 472 of the Code, C. L. 1921, provides:
"Duty and powers 'of judge at chambers.-Sec. 29. The judges of courts of
record shall, at all reasonable times, when not engaged in holding courts, transact such
business at their chambers as may be done out of court. At chambers they may hear
and dispose of all applications for orders and writs which are usually granted in the
first instance upon ex parte application, and may, in their discretion, also hear applications to discharge such orders and writs."
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You will note that this section provides that the "judges
when not holding courts" may "transact such business as
may be done out of court."
For the better administration of justice it follows, in the
interest of public policy, that when a judge is "holding
court," his judicial duties should be performed in open court,
in the regular court room, open to the public, where the court
reporter and clerk are in their places to take down and record
XII.
the proceedings.
MAKING UP ISSUES

The greatest delay in the trial of cases occurs, in my
opinion, in making up the issues. The filing of various motions to quash service of summons, to strike parts of complaint, answer or replication, and a motion to make them
more specific and certain, and finally a demurrer to some or
all of said pleadings takes much time and prolongs the reaching of the case for trial on the merits if the court sets such
matters for hearing several weeks ahead on the docket after
notice has been served and a setting asked for a day for
hearing.
I do not in any way desire to discourage the filing of any
or all of said motions or demurrers as the attorneys elect, but,
in my opinion, they should all be set for hearing on the next
hearing day after the filing of the notice, unless for some
reason attorneys request a later date.
Experience shows that generally on calling the docket,
several of such matters will be withdrawn before argument,
others will be submitted without argument, and a number
will have to be continued to accommodate counsel for one
reason or another, with the result that not more than eight
come up for actual hearing, and some of them not taking
more than five or ten minutes of the time of the court. Unless this system prevails, frequently the docket gets blocked,
and much of the time of the court is idle.
XIII.
Ex PARTE RESTRAINING ORDERS

Divorce Cases
Sec. 5721, C. L. 1921, and Rule I of the Rules of the
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District Court, define the office and powers of the presiding
judge. Sec. 5 of the rules provides, among other things, "The
presiding judge shall act on all matters before cases have been
assigned."
In the May, 1932, issue of "Dicta" on page 190 there is
an opinion by me as presiding judge on ex parte orders in
divorce proceedings.
In the case of Sedgwick v. Sedgwick, 50 Colo. 164, the
question was before the Supreme Court. Paragraph 1 of the
syllabus states:
"1. INJUNCTION-PRELIMINARY-OBTAINED BY FALSE REPRESENTATIONS OR PRACTICE AS TO EMERGENCY.-Nothing in the provisions
of the code requires the discontinuance of an action, on account of the wrongful procuring of a preliminary restraining order, unless the opposing party moves to have the
case dismissed on said account."

The questions as to whether or not the code provisions
on injunction, or as to whether the district court possesses
inherent common-law power to issue restraining orders without notice and without bond, was not decided for the aforesaid reason.
On page 168 the court says:
"This is not to be construed as implying that the code provision on injunction is
applicable to divorce actions. Whether the district court possesses inherent comon-law
power to issue restraining orders in proper cases, in divorce actions, without notice and
without bond, we express no opinion."

As presiding judge, before whom the applications for
practically all of these drastic orders are heard, after reviewing
the authorities, I decided that, as a matter of law, the court
possesses no such arbitrary power, and that certain provisions
of our code of civil procedure (Secs. 165, 167) concerning
notice (406-407) and contempt (Sec. 365) of court do apply to divorce proceedings, and other sections of the code that
are not in conflict with the statutes concerning divorce and
alimony (Secs. 5593 to 5609, C. L. 1921, and amendments
thereto). It should be borne in mind that these arbitrary
orders are not asked in cases except where the husband and
wife are actually living together at the time of the filing of
the complaint for divorce and make the ex parte application
without notice.
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The last section of our civil code, 479, C. L. 1921, says:
"The rule of the common law, that statutes in derogation thereof are to be
strictly construed, has no application, to this code. Its provisions, and all proceedings
under it, shall be liberally construed, with a view to promote its object and assist the
parties in obtaining justice."

From practical experience, and the records of the clerk's
office, the way the custom works out in the courts is that the
husband being summarily, without notice, barred from his
own home by an ex parte order of the court, where he has
been living with his wife and family, leaves the wife to take
the divorce by default and the property by some settlement.
A previous notice before the drastic order would have given
the husband and wife an opportunity for reconciliation.
It is the unfair advantage that the practice of granting
these ex parte orders without notice has upon the marriage
relation and the orderly proceedings of the court that I stress
this point.
It should be borne in mind that the interest of the complaining wife, as she sees it when applying ex parte, is not
the only one to be considered in the granting of such ex parte
orders, but the interest of the state and minor children. A
case has never come to my knowledge where a husband was
living in his home with his family, and she, ex parte, obtained
one of these drastic orders, became reconciled.
The above fact is one reason why so many of them have
been applied for in the past.
People ex rel. v. MacCabe, 18 Colo. 186.
XIV.
CASES NOT JUGGLED

The practice, that has sometimes prevailed in the past, of
juggling cases from division to division and from judge to
judge, either when assigned or by request of an attorney, or
by dismissing without prejudice of a case and refiling the
same, when it appears to the court that the object was to get
that particular case before a particular judge, or to avoid a
certain judge, for one reason or another, has been stopped by
amendment of Rule II, requiring all cases to be assigned to
divisions in open court, and by certain decisions and opinions
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of record in certain cases where the question has been raised
and passed upon by the court.
The reason for stopping that practice was that it was
demoralizing to the legal profession and the administration
of justice.
There is usually behind such action an ulterior motive to
prevent justice.
Our judges are not timid, but have the courage of their
convictions; and if any lawyer or his client has any charges
to make or reasons why a certain judge should not try a case,
let him face the facts, file his motion, supported by affidavit
as evidence of his good faith, as was done in the case of People
v. District Court, 84 Colo. 367.
I think I speak for all the judges of the District Court
when I say that a loose practice on this question will not be
tolerated in the future.
Colin A. Smith, formerly attorney for the Public Utilities Commission for Denver, Colorado, has entered private
practice.
DATES AND SUBJECTS OF RADIO BROADCASTS
PRESENTED BY THE AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION
FEB. 12 The American Bar, Its Past Leaders and Its Present Aimst
CLARENCE E. MARTIN, President of the American Bar Association,

introduced by

WILLIAM J. DONOVAN,
Geaneral

former Assistant United States Attorney

FEB. 19 Training for the Bar
ROSCOE POUND, Dean of the Harvard Law School
FEB. 26

An Interview: A Young Man in Search of a Profession Asks
Mr. Rogers, "Shall I Become a Lawyer?"
JAMES GRAFTON ROGERS, Assistant Secretary of State
MARCH 5

The Lawyer's Influence on Public Opinion
Counsel, New York City Investigation
Committee
MARCH 12 Pitfalls Along the Legal Education Road
JOHN KIRKLAND CLARK, Chairman, Section of Legal Education and
Admissions to the Bar of the American Bar Association
JUDGE

SAMUEL SEABURY,

SDictaphun_.

IS NOTHING SACRED TO THIS MAN?
In 10 DICTA 21 we said: "
. this column would have been
a memory long ago if we had paid any attention to such things (copyrights)." Our somewhat esteemed contemporary Colorado Dodo in
proximity to its masthead announces that exclusive reprint privileges
belong to our somewhat less esteemed contemporary College Humor.
Since we have repeatedly violated the Federal copyright statutes-literary scofflaws so to speak-we will unhesitatingly repudiate, fling
down and trample upon Dodo's contract with Collitch Humor. To a
waiting world that has read none of the foregoing we now reprint from
Dodo this gem, undoubtedly taken without credit by Dodo from
another thief, to-wit:
Some humor stuff is excellent
And some is rather sloppy;
But excellent or not so hot,
Nine-tenths of it is "copy."

THE MISPRINT INTENTIONAL?
For some days following the decision in Denver Land Co. v.
Moffat Tunnel Improvement District, et al. (q. v.), recently handed
down, with three judges trying to hand it up again, a well known
Denver daily afternoon newspaper in its list of market quotations
headed "Local Securities" announced the prices of Moffat Tunnel bonds
thus:
Bid
Asked
Moffat Tunnel 5 2 s -05.10
°-4.90
do
54 s (fat) ------98.00
102.00
The (fat) issue, for your information, is the supplemental kind.

COMPETITION IS NOT THE LIFE OF HUMOR
Dictaphun views with alarm the article "Samuel E. Browne; or,
The Little General from Ohio" appearing in 10 DICTA 50. While
we approve the Horatio-Alger,-Jr. style of having a sub-title, we resent
the fact that William H. Robinson, Jr., Esq., its author, lends a comic
touch throughout. For Mr. Robinson's information (and for yours
too you zany) Dictaphun has exclusive rights to attempt to be funny
in DICTA. Infringements will be copied.
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MATTSON, ESQ., ON THE NEW COURT HOUSE
(CITY AND COUNTY BUILDING TO BEGOLE)
Mr. B. C. Hilliard, Jr.,*
Attorney at Law, Midland Savings Bldg.,
Denver, Colorado.
Dear Sir:
Having visited the Building of Magnificent Distance this morning
(December 27, 1932) and looked (down) upon Justice in Her new
abode (this seems to be correct since the entry of The Order) I have
come to the conclusion that your publication has an opportunity to be
of great service to the Bar. (We deny this-it was never our intention.-Ed.)
My suggestion is that you prepare and publish a directory and
chart (map) of said building for the use of the attorneys. I was intending to suggest that the various points of interest be located by latitude and longitude (since everything seems to be at sea), but Judge
Holland advises that no latitude will be allowed attorneys trying to
appear in Division 1, 2 or 3, and 4 and 5, on the same morning (day).
However, you can use the U. S. Government survey designations by
giving the quarter section locations and be sure and give the meridian.
Incidently I was somewhat surprised to learn that Mountain Time prevails in all divisions of the District Court.
If this work should cause you any inconvenience (it never inconveniences us to have others do our work.-Ed.) or distress, remember
what the profession has suffered before reaching "Supreme Court Decisions.

Yours, &c.,

FRED W. MATTSON.
And please remember, Mr. Mattson, that not only the profession
but clients suffer from Supreme Court Decisions.

STOP US IF YOU HAVE HEARD THIS ONE
Con K. O'Byrne, Esq., under the impression that it was too far
from his office to the New Court House (City and County Building to
Begole), took a taxicab from the former to the latter. Arriving presently at one of the divisions of the District Court that is located somewhere he lamented his expenditure of cab fare, remarking, "I had to
walk three blocks after I got in the so and so building."
*We wanted to print our name because we have used Mr. Hellerstein's several
times and he is only the Editor-in-Chief.

(EDITOR'S NOTE.-It is intended to print brief abstracts of the decisions of the
Supreme Court in the issue of Dicta next appearing after the rendition thereof. In the
event of a filing of a petition for rehearing, resulting in any change or modification of
opinion, such will be indicated in later digests.)
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LEGISLATION RELATING TO OLD AGE PENSION LAW-PARTIAL UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES-No.

13149-The City and County of Denver et al. vs. Anna Lynch and
George A. Luxford, as County Judge of the City and County of
Denver-Decided December 29, 1932.
Where the Legislature passed an "Act Relating to Old Age Pensions," and after setting out the requirements to qualify under the Act,
provided that the County Judge should "fix the amount of the pension
with the approval of the board of county commissioners" and that
"such court and board shall be final" and made additional
provisions
relating thereto, said Act was held to be unconstitutional in that it
attempted to confer judicial duties upon officials of another department
of government.
Where it appears that, in all probability, the invalid portion of the
Act was an inducement to the passage of the valid, and it is not clear
that it was the intent of the General Assembly to establish the old age
pension system and force it upon the counties with their commissioners
deprived of all control over its administration or that the resulting
finality of the decision of the county judge would be as potent an argument with the lawmakers for the passage of the Act as the finality of
the joint decision of the county judge and the holders of the county
pursestrings, it was concluded by the court that the unconstitutional
portion of the Act carried the whole down with it.--Judgment reversed
-Mr. Justice Hilliard dissents.
TAXATION -

EXEMPTION -

CHARITABLE ORGANIZATION -

Denver

Press Club us. Collins, as Assessor, etc.-No. 12731-Decided December 27, 1 9 32-Opinion by Mr. Justice Alter.
1. A club, formed to create closer social relations among persons
engaged in a particular line of work and to promote the interests of the
members of the club, is a social organization, and, although it carried
on incidental charitable work, its property is not within the purview of
Sec. 5, Art. 10 of the Constitution of Colorado and, therefore, is not
tax exempt.-Judgment affirmed.
WILLS-INVALID

BEQUEST-ADMISSION

TO PROBATE-Ireland

vs.

Hudson et al.-No. 12965-Decided December 30, 1932-Opinion
by Mr. Justice Campbell.
1. An instrument of testamentary nature, properly executed, and
containing several valid bequests, will not be refused admission to pro-
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bate merely because another attempted bequest is invalid.--Judgment
affirmed.
REVENUE-PROPERTY SUBJECT TO TAXES-WORTHLESS EQUITY
IN REAL PROPERTY-EXCESSIVE TAXES-PROCEDURE TO RECOVER - PLEADINGS - NECESSARY ALLEGATIONS - Bordner vs.

Board of County Commissioners Baca County-No. 12817-Decided December 27, 1932-Opinion by Mr. Justice Moore.

1. Bordner sued the Board of County Commissioners to recover
$466.72 protested payments of taxes for years 1922 to 1928 inclusive,
assessed against his equity in certain school lands, protesting that said
taxes were void because "plaintiff owed a greater debt upon said lands
than the value of the lands," and "did not own an equity in said lands
of any value whatsoever."
A demurrer to this complaint was sustained and the cause dismissed.
2. An equity in real estate is a property right subject to taxes
notwithstanding it may have no cash value; if of no value, a tax assessment would be excessive but not illegal.
3. Where taxes are excessive the taxpayer must first seek administrative relief afforded by statute.
4. The complaint must allege and the proofs must show that the
taxes were paid under protest and that the administrative remedies provided by statute were invoked.-Judgment affirmed.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-PETITIONERS FOR INCORPORATIONLANDOWNERS--BONA FIDE LANDOWNERS"-HOLDERS UNDER
CONDITIONS SUBSEQUENT-EVIDENCE OF CONDUCT AFTER SIGN-

ING PETITION-ADMISSIBILITY-The People of State of Colorado,

on Relation of I. J. Taylor et al. vs. E. P. Koerner et al.-No.
12888-Decided December 27, 1932--Opinion by Mr. Justice
Butler.

1. A proceeding to have declared invalid the attempted incorporation of Town of Paoli on grounds that twenty-one signers of the
petition for incorporation were not landowners or were not "bona fide"
landowners. Each of said petitioners had purchased his land at the
price of $25 a lot, paying only $2.50 in cash and receiving a Warranty
Deed therefor, which was recorded, and executing his promissory note
for the balance. Each purchaser placed in escrow a Warranty Deed
from himself to the vendor covering the same property, under escrow
instructions to deliver the deed to the vendor if the notes were not paid
at maturity, or to cancel the deed if the notes were paid.
2. The conveyances to the purchasers transferred title and were
analogous to conveyances upon condition subsequent, divesting the
grantor of his title and vesting it in the grantee, subject to being revested
in the grantor in the event of failure to pay the note at maturity. The
purchasers were, therefore, landowners at the time of signing the petition.
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3. Evidence that most of the purchasers completed their payments was properly admitted by the trial court, as evidence of conduct
after signing the petition would help to show the good faith or bad
faith of the parties when they entered into the arrangement.--Judgment affirmed.
TRIAL-FINDINGS OF FACT-DISTURBED WHEN-SURPRISE-Hiner
vs. Cassidy-No. 12764-Decided December 27, 1932--Opinion

by Mr. Justice Butler.
When upon conflicting evidence the trial court determines issues
of fact, those findings will not be disturbed upon review. On review,
the record is viewed in the light most favorable to the successful party
in the trial court.
Where defendant has pleaded that she received an assignment of a
claim for collection against a construction company but where the
proof is that she received the claim for collection against a bonding
company, this does not constitute surprise. It is true there was a variance, but had objection been made thereto on the ground of variance,
an amendment to the pleadings could and would have been allowed.
Where a variance does not affect the substantial rights of the parties, it
cannot be made the grounds for reversal.-Judgment affirmed.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-CONTRACTS FOR PURCHASE OF FURNI-

TURE-VALIDITY OF-Harvey vs. City and County of Denver
et at.-No. 13220-Decided December 30, 1932--Opinion by Mr.
Justice Burke.
1.
Plaintiff, as a taxpayer, asks to enjoin the city through its commissioner of supplies from completing a purchase of furniture for a new
court house. In the lower court, the issues were found for the defendants. Whereupon the defendants allege error and ask that this writ be
made a supersedeas one. A supersedeas will not lie since the judgment
was for costs only.
11.
Although defendants allege the matter to be one publici juris, no
such right is herein involved and the cause should not have been advanced on the docket.
The facts when applied to provisions of the charter show compliance therewith.--Judgment affirmed.
CONTEMPT-CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTE--Jones vs. Cutting et at.

-No.
13157-Decided January 7, 1933--Opinion by Mr. Chief
Justice Adams-En banc.
1. In a civil action pending in the district court, the court ordered
Jones to give his deposition before a notary public as upon cross exam-
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ination under the statute. He prosecutes error to review judgment.
The statutereferred to is Sec. 6570 C. L. 1921. The facts in essential
particulars are similar to those set forth in cause No. 12937, Taylor vs.
Briggs, wherein we held that procedure adopted was unauthorized. The
judgment is reversed, and cause remanded.-Mr. Justice Campbell and
Mr. Justice Alter not participating.
CONFESSIONS -

EVIDENCE --

ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE -

PUR-

POSES FOR ADMISSION - WHETHER CONFESSION VOLUNTARY
QUESTION FOR COURT-Moss vs. The People-No. 13161-De-

cided December 27, 1932--Opinion by Mr. Justice Campbell-En
banc.
1. Defendant Moss was found guilty of murder in the first degree and sentenced to death. The conviction is based principally upon
defendant's confession. The trial court held hearing separate from the
main trial to ascertain if confession was voluntary and found it was.
Held, "Whether or not a confession is voluntary is primarily a question
for the trial court. Its admissibility is largely within the discretion of
that court; and, on review, its ruling thereon will not be disturbed,
unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion." No such abuse appears here.
2. Over defendant's objection, the State introduced evidence of a
microscopic slide containing a specimen of the blood of deceased. A
witness, who had been engaged in chemical laboratory and microscopical work for twelve years, was permitted to testify as an expert concerning this blood. Held, "The rule established by the weight of
authority is that the decision of the trial court as to the qualification of
any expert is never reversed, except in cases of abuse." No such abuse
appears here.
3. Evidence was introduced at the trial over defendant's objection, that defendant had not been at a certain pool hall the night of
the murder. Defendant contended that the State was putting defendant's character in issue, before defendant had alleged his good character.
Held, that the purpose of this testimony was not for the purpose of
placing defendant's character in issue, but for the purpose of showing
defendant was not at a certain place, which he frequented, on the night
of the murder.--Judgment affirmed.
PUBLIC UTILITIES-CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY-FINDING OF
FACT BY COMMISSION-Public Utilities Commission et al. vs. The

Town of Erie et a.-No. 13207-Decided January 7, 1933Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Adams.
I.
A finding of fact as to what public convenience and necessity requires at the time of the order when based upon ample testimony and
when not found to be unjust or unreasonable cannot be reversed upon
appeal to the District Court.--Judgment reuersed.with instructions to
reinstate the order of the Commission.

Compliments of

ALEXANDER J. LINDSAY AND COMPANY
CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS
TAX CONSULTANTS
SECURITY BUILDING
DENVER

Beginning with this-February, 1933issue of DICTA, SYDNEY H. GROSSMAN will
handle all advertising matter.

The Denver Coal
& Timber Co.
has given fifteen years of faithful service to consumers, featuring quality.
quantity and service on all grades of
coal, at lowest market prices. Phone
your next order to

Compliments

DEAN D. CLARK

rhe Denver Coal & Timber Co.
Phone TAbor 4704

"Laid in the Shadow of the Rockies"
Produced by Colorado Poultrymen for
Colorado Consumers-Demand

Rollandet and

Skyland Eggs

Stratton

"They're Fed for Flavor"

Patent Trade-Mark and Copyright
Attorneys

If your Grocer can't supply you, call Us
MAin 5864

COLORADO POULTRY AND
EGG PRODUCERS, INC.

Suite 1117 Security Bldg.
MAin 5295

/ _),n
.. Flowers and Decorations
Flowers Anywhere by Wire Service
Distinction

TAbor 5521

Dependability

Denver National Building

823 17th Street

Engineering

DIETER
Bookbinding Co.

Legal Inve stigations-Exa minations
Cou rt Work-Repoorts

Bookbinding for Lawyers and Their
Clients

Louis G. Carp enter

1455 Gilpin

YOrk 4676

Hoff-Schroeder's
Cafe Gothic

Cafeteria

BREAKFAST . . . LUNCHEON . . . DINNER
Wholesome, Tasty Luncheons, 25c, 35c, 40c, up
Our Full Course 50c Dinner Will Delight You
Also Regular Cafeteria and Cafe Service

GOTHIC GROTTO-Candlelight Dancing
every Friday, Saturday and Sunday Nights
9:30 P. M. to I A. M. Price 40c per
Person.

LEGAL BRIEFS AND
ABSTRACTS OF RECORD
SPEED-ACCURACY

1130 23rd Street

MAin 3054

LetlKELEHER
1987 Broadway
TAbor 2607
Handle Your Printing, Multigraphing, Mimeographing, Addressing and Mailing
Reasonable Prices
Quality and Service Guaranteed

Our equipment is adapted to just
such rush work. We have been
printing briefs since 1881 and
know just what the judges and
attorneys demand.

The Bradford-Robinson Printing Co.
PHONE KEYSTONE 0111

No Brief Too Small-None Too Large

TRUST BANKING
for

Corporations and Individuals
Services to Corporations
Trustee under Corporate Mortgages
Depositary for Protective Committees .
Transfer Agent and Registrar for Corporate
Stocks . . . Miscellaneous Fiscal Agencies.
f

f

f

Services to Individuals and Families
Executor and Administrator of Estates . . .
Trustee under Wills . . . Trustee of Living
Trusts and Life Insurance Trusts . . . Safekeeping of Securities.
f

f

f

Escrows
f

f

f

BUSINESS SERVICE FOR BUSINESS MEN
AND WOMEN AND THEIR COUNSEL.
f

f

•

THE UNITED STATES NATIONAL BANK
THE AMERICAN NATIONAL BANK
THE DENVER NATIONAL BANK
THE COLORADO NATIONAL BANK
THE INTERNATIONAL TRUST COMPANY

IlL

